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10b-5 OR NOT 10b-5?: ARE THE CURRENT EFFORTS TO
REFORM SECURITIES LITIGATION MISGUIDED?
ADAM F INGBER
INTRODUCTION
For close to fifty years Rule lOb-5' (the "Rule") has provided a rem-
edy for private investors injured as a result of securities fraud. Over this
period, the courts have painstakingly defined, honed, and developed the
Rule, thereby establishing it as a proven weapon to counter securities
fraud violations.
Recently, however, Rule lOb-5 has come under attack. Politicians and
business leaders assert that extant principles of Rule lOb-5 litigation en-
courage meritless suits that have spawned an excess of securities litiga-
tion. These groups argue that this superfluous litigation hinders
America's global competitiveness and threatens the viability of major fi-
nancial institutions.2 In response to these concerns, legislative efforts
have commenced in earnest to restrict litigation under Rule lOb-5.
In August 1992, bills targeting Rule lOb-5 litigation (the "bills") were
introduced in both houses of Congress as part of a bipartisan effort to
reform Rule lOb-5.3 Although Congress did not act upon the bills before
the Congressional session ended, the original sponsors of the House bill
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1992). Rule lob-5 was promulgated by the Securities Ex-
change Commission ("SEC"). The rule provides as follows:
§ 240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
2. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici); 138 Cong. Rec. E2463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Rep. Tauzin).
3. See H.R 5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Representatives Tauzin, Lent, Hall,
and Ritter introduced the House bill. The legislation is described as a bill "[tio amend
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to reform private enforcement of the Fed-
eral securities laws, and for other purposes." Id. The bill is entitled the Securities Private
Enforcement Reform Act. See id.; S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Senators
Domenici and Sanford introduced the Senate bill. The Senate bill was titled the Securi-
ties Private Enforcement Act of 1992. See id. The bill died at the end of the 102d Con-
gress. As of the writing of this Note, the Senators have not reintroduced their bill. For
an up-to-date listing of bill H.R. 417's co-sponsors, see Securities Private Enforcement
Reform Act, Bill Tracking Report, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLTRK File
(presenting the list of sponsors and cosponsors of the house bill and their respective polit-
ical parties).
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reintroduced it to the new Congressional session in early 1993.1 The leg-
islative proposals put forth in the House bill embody sweeping changes to
the procedural provisions of the Rule, and will produce far-reaching con-
sequences for participants in the securities industry-investment bank-
ers, insurance companies, accounting firms, and investors. Among the
proposals under consideration are provisions for fee shifting, propor-
tional liability in place of joint and several liability, a heightened burden
of proof-from a preponderance of the evidence standard to a clear and
convincing evidence standard, and an extended statute of limitations
period.6
The proposed reforms are controversial. Controversy over these pro-
posals may be heightened by the fact that one of the premises underlying
the reforms-that Rule 10b-5 encourages frivolous litigation-is dubious
at best. Even assuming that underlying premise is true, the reforms sug-
gested embody risks that may outweigh the intended benefits. In other
words, the cure may be worse than the disease. The fear is that the pro-
posed reforms will chill private enforcement of the securities law to such
an extent that Rule 10b-5 will no longer be an effective deterrent against
securities fraud.
This Note explores the recent efforts to restrict litigation under Rule
10b-5 and argues that the present Rule lOb-5 reform measures are
merely cosmetic remedies that conceal more troubling issues. Specifi-
cally, this Note asserts that the putative evils attributed to Rule lOb-5
abuse can be more readily traced to problems identified with class action
litigation in general, the dual role of the public accountant, and the de-
velopment of alternative, overlapping securities fraud remedies.
In addition, this Note argues that along with difficulties relating to the
substance of the proposed reforms, development and expansion of alter-
4. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
5. The House bill and the Senate bill contained substantially similar provisions.
Compare H.R. 5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) and H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (containing a provision for a new statute of limitations for Rule lOb-5 actions,
proportionate liability in place of joint and several liability and fee shifting where the
losing party's claim was not substantially justified) with S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) (same). One difference between the two bills concerns the specifics of their fee
shifting provisions. Fee shifting under the House bill is nearly automatic because the
House bill directs the court to award attorney fees and costs to the successful litigant
"unless the the court determines that the position of the losing party was substantially
justified." H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(b) (1993). The Senate bill's fee shifting
provision, by contrast, contains certain pre-conditions to fee shifting. First, the Senate
bill permits fee shifting only if the court entered a prelimary ruling stating that fee shift-
ing might be appropriate in the case. See S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(c)(1) (1992).
Second, after a final judgment in the action, to recover fees and expenses, the prevailing
party must make a motion for fees and expenses. See id. § 3(b)(1). Both bills exempt
substantially justified claims from fee shifting. See id. § 3(b)(2); H.R. 417, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(b)(1) (1993).
6. See H.R. 5828, §§ 3-5; see also infra part II (discussing three reform proposals at
length). The proposals also include provisions for limiting attorney fees in class action
litigation. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
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native securities fraud remedies threaten to vitiate the intended remedial
effects of the proposed reforms. In particular, while the legislative spot-
light shines on Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs continue to turn to the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act' ("RICO") to provide an al-
ternative security fraud remedy.
Part I of this Note discusses the background, motivations, and pre-
sumptions giving rise to the movement towards reform. Part II examines
specific reform proposals and explores some of the difficulties they engen-
der. Part III argues that Congress should abandon Rule lOb-5 reform.
This Note concludes that Congress should instead redirect its efforts to-
wards the reform of overlapping securities fraud remedies, starting with
civil RICO.
I. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF § 10(b): ESSENTIAL FOR
EFFICIENT MARKETS
Congress enacted section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19348 (the "'34 Act") to address securities fraud. More precisely, Con-
gress enacted section 10(b) to prevent "knowing and intentional miscon-
duct designed to deceive or defraud investors." 9 Towards this end,
section 10(b) authorizes the Securities Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") to promulgate rules to effectuate section 10(b)'s purpose." Ac-
cordingly, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 to implement section 10(b)
of the '34 Act.1" Neither section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 expressly provide
for a private right of action to enforce their provisions. Since 1946, how-
ever, the courts have implied such a right. 2 Courts and commentators
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 111990). Section 10(b) provides in relevant
part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
9. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 387 (1990) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976)); see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-90 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1977).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
11. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
12. See id.; Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2779-80 (1991) (acknowledging that private actions under § 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule
lOb-5 have been implied by courts for close to 50 years); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 196 n.16 (1976) (citing Kardon as support); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
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have since recognized that private actions under Rule lOb-5 are essential
to the effective functioning of the securities laws because the government
lacks the resources to police Rule lOb-5 violations alone.' 3 Private ac-
tions supplement government enforcement efforts and ensure the integ-
rity and efficiency of the markets by deputizing investors to enforce the
law as "private attorneys general."14
Reforms that increase the burdens upon investors seeking to enforce
Rule lob-5 through private litigation entail a risk that they will diminish
the effectiveness of the private attorney general patrol. Such reforms
may also undermine confidence in the securities markets because the
threat of civil liability is a crucial deterrent to securities fraud.' 5
II. FACTORS UNDERLYING THE CURRENT REFORM MOVEMENT: A
CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY
Proponents of reform allege that abuses of Rule lOb-5 have caused far
reaching deleterious consequences. For example, supporters of reform
assert that Rule lOb-5 is used by investors to hedge against investment
loss. 6 Such abuse occurs when investors faced with a loss resulting from
a movement in the price of a stock simply sue under Rule lOb-5 to re-
cover their losses.I7 In addition, Rule lOb-5 allegedly is used by specula-
13. See Richard C. Breeden, Remarks at Corporate Counsel Institute 5, (Oct. 16,
1991) (transcript on file with Fordham Law Review) ("Private securities litigation has
long been recognized as an important tool for helping to achieve the enforcement of the
federal securities laws.... Private actions have a very important role to play in redressing
the effects of deliberate fraud on investors, and in supplementing the enforcement efforts
of the SEC."); Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The resources
of the [SEC] are adequate to prosecute only the most flagrant abuses. To this end, private
actions brought by investors have long been viewed as a necessary supplement to SEC
enforcement actions.") (citations omitted); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964) (noting that private actions supplement SEC enforcement efforts).
14. 5A Arnold S. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5, § 8.01, at 1-228
(2d ed. 1992). Governmental action, while important, is incapable of enforcing the secur-
ities laws alone. Private actions are the primary enforcement mechanism of the securities
laws. Private actions are "the most effective way to police lOb-5 breaches and provide[ ]
the deterrent element so essential in securities transactions." Id. § 8.01, at 1-228 to 1-229
(citations omitted). Judge Jerome Frank first used the term "private attorney general" in
an opinion in 1943 to refer to private individuals who are authorized to bring actions to
"vindicate the public interest." Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.),
vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). For a brief review of the development of private enforce-
ment, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding The Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 669-70 n.1 (1986).
15. See Berner, 730 F.2d at 1323.
16. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici); 138 Cong. Rec. E2463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Rep. Tauzin).
Both Senator Domenici and Representative Tauzin alleged that speculators were institut-
ing suits under Rule lOb-5 to recover investment losses. Senator Domenici further stated
that a lawsuit investment hedge is employed regardless of whether the stock price moves
up or down, because any move in the price of a stock produces losses. See 138 Cong.
Rec. S12,599, S12,599.
17. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599, S12,599; see also Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 635
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tors to coerce large settlements from defendants."8 Further abuses
include the use of pro forma complaints alleging Rule lOb-5 violations,
filed by certain law firms merely upon the news of stock price swings. 9
According to reformers, these abuses of Rule lOb-5 have adversely ef-
fected the national economy. For example, they argue that the increased
incidence of securities fraud litigation has discouraged experienced direc-
tors and officers from sitting on the boards of directors of publicly held
corporations.2' In addition, they allege that excessive securities fraud lit-
igation has devastated the accounting industry to the extent that many
accounting firms now avoid auditing companies with highly volatile
stocks.21
Proponents of reform argue that these developments threaten
America's global competitiveness. They base their argument on the
premise that incipient companies often experience stock volatility and
that such companies often introduce innovative products." If account-
ants refuse to audit these companies' financial statements, such compa-
nies will have difficulty raising cash in the capital markets.' Lack of
capital will hinder these companies from introducing their innovative
products.24 Consequently, excessive securities litigation is said to hinder
America's global competitiveness.25
Although Rule lOb-5 abuses do exist,26 there are underlying issues
which, arguably, are themselves responsible for the adverse effects attrib-
uted to Rule lOb-5 litigation. These underlying issues, discussed below,
include the perception of excess litigation in our society, the abuse of
class action litigation and the attempt by repeat defendants to limit their
liability.
F. Supp. 399, 405 (D. Mass. 1985) (admonishing the plaintiff that Rule lOb-5 was not
designed to provide recovery for an ordinary investment loss), aff'd, 814 F.2d 798, 806
(1st Cir. 1987).
18. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
19. See id. at S12,599-600.
20. See id. at S12,601.
21. See id. at S12,599; Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., The Liability Crisis in the
United States: Impact on the Accounting Profession 5 (1992). The industries that pose a
heightened liability risk to auditors include "financial institutions, insurance companies,
[ ] real estate investment firms[]... high technology and mid-size companies, and private
companies making initial public offerings (IPOs)." Id. While the larger firms are screen-
ing their clients more carefully, some of the mid-size and smaller accounting firms have
abandoned their audit business entirely. See id.
22. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici); 138 Cong. Rec. E2463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Rep. Tauzin).
23. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599, S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici).
24. See id.
25. See id.; Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., supra note 21, at 5.
26. See eg., Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 635 F. Supp. 399, 405 (D. Mass. 1985)
(admonishing plaintiff that Rule lOb-5 was not designed to provide recovery for an ordi-
nary investment loss), aff'd, 814 F.2d 798, 806 (1st Cir. 1987).
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A. Societal Perception of a Litigation Explosion
Over the past decade, the perception of litigation as a national pastime
has been debated forcefully.27 Politicians28 and academics 29 have argued
that America suffers from excessive litigation and Congress or the judici-
ary should somehow restrict access to the courts. Consistent with this
trend, litigation reform efforts have recently focused on restricting suits
under Rule 10b-5.30
In many respects, the debate over securities litigation reform parallels
the larger debate concerning general litigation reform in our society. Ar-
guably, the current Rule lOb-5 reform movement is simply an outgrowth
of the larger movement towards litigation reform; it incorporates many
of the same disputed assumptions and arguments. A brief discussion of
the general litigation reform debate is therefore relevant in exploring the
impetus for securities litigation reform.
1. General Litigation Explosion
On one side of the debate over general litigation reform are those who
assert that the courts are flooded with frivolous lawsuits that cost society
upwards of $300 billion a year.3 These groups argue that "America[ ]'s
27. Compare Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion (1991) (arguing that
America is experiencing a litigation explosion) and Peter W. Huber, Liability (1988) (ar-
guing that the development of tort law and expansion of liability over the past three
decades primarily has benefitted lawyers while resulting in a "tort tax" levied upon soci-
ety) and Warren E. Burger, Too Many Lawyers, Too Many Suits, N.Y. Times (Book
Rev.), May 12, 1991, at 12 (review of Olson's book, supra) with Marc Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983) (ana-
lyzing data on the way society currently processes disputes and arguing that claims that
America is an overlitigatious society draw upon weak scholarship and flawed policy anal-
ysis) and Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are
the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901, 1909 (1989) (doubting the
existence of a litigation explosion and noting that federal judges have approximately the
same number of cases now as they had in 1960) and Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 440,
442 n.54 (1986) (noting that "dramatic increases in litigation are hardly unprecedented"
and "empirical investigation suggests that the current preoccupation with the litigation
'boom' may be an overreaction").
28. See, e.g., Nancy E. Roman, Angry at Bush and Quayle, Lawyers Pour Funds to
Clinton, Wash. Times, Oct. 5, 1992, at A5 (reporting that Vice President Dan Quayle has
argued repeatedly that there are "too many lawyers and too much litigation and that
frivolous lawsuits increase medical costs, consumer costs, and insurance premiums"); Joe
Queenan, Birth of a Notion, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1992, at Cl, C2 (reporting that Vice
President Dan Quayle argued that litigation costs Americans $80 billion dollars per
annum).
29. See sources cited supra note 27.
30. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992);
H.R. 5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
31. See American Bar Assoc., Comparisons of Various Studies of the U.S. Civil Justice
System with the Remarks of President Bush and Vice President Bush and Vice President
Quayle 4 (developed by Talbot D'Alemberte) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
"'Every year in America, individuals and businesses spend more than [$]80 billion on
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love affair with the lawsuit" 2 causes far reaching consequences. For ex-
ample, excessive litigation allegedly hinders national competitiveness 33
by discouraging the development of new products, 3 increasing unem-
ployment,35 and flooding the courts with frivolous cases that expend judi-
cial time and effort more appropriately reserved for meritorious suits.36
These assertions, however, are strongly contested.37 On the other side
of the debate, critics argue that the $300 billion estimated cost of litiga-
tion is not based upon sound evidence but is instead the product of
flawed assumptions and calculations. 31 Indeed, critics argue that calcula-
tions regarding the costs of a liability system are far from precise.39
Moreover, the $300 billion statistic erroneously considers the costs of
litigation while ignoring the intangible benefits of litigation.' Critics ar-
gue that by reducing the analysis of litigation to a financial costs/benefits
calculus one ignores many of the important incalculable benefits that the
law performs, such as creating incentives for product enhancement and
product safety.41
2. Notion of Litigation Explosion Underlying Securities Reform
Legislative efforts to reform securities litigation coincide with the gen-
eral litigation reform debate and incorporate some of the same argu-
ments. For example, proposed securities reform legislation explicitly
embraces the notion of a general litigation explosion.42 Senator
Domenici, sponsor of the now-defunct Senate bill, stated that "[society
direct litigation costs and higher insurance premiums. When you include the indirect
costs, it may add up to more than [$]300 billion."' Id. (quoting Vice President Dan
Quayle's remarks at the Annual ABA meeting in Atlanta Georgia, Aug. 13, 1991).
32. Id. at 2 (quoting President George Bush in an address to the National Grocers
Association on Feb. 4, 1992).
33. See id. at 3.
34. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599-60 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici).
35. See id.
36. See Marc Galanter, Pick A Number, Any Number, Am. Law., Apr. 1992, at 82.
37. See id.
38. See id.; Presumed Guilty, Economist, Sept. 12, 1992, at 30. The claim that litiga-
tion costs $300 billion a year is "bogus." Id. The $300 billion dollar estimated cost of
litigation to society was a product of conjecture and dubious scholarship-the figure
started out as $80 billion which was a number forwarded in the course of a "round-table
discussion of insurance costs by a group of executives in 1986 .... [That figure was
multiplied] by 3.5 to create an estimate for the indirect costs of litigation: some $300
billion." Milo Geyelin, Tort Bar's Scourge, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1992, at Al, Al.
39. See Presumed Guilty, supra note 38, at 30; Geyelin, supra note 38, at Al.
40. See Galanter, supra note 36, at 85. By emphasizing the financial costs of litiga-
tion, one fails to take into account some of the incalculable benefits of litigation. Litiga-
tion provides "vindication [of legal rights], induce[s] investment in safety, and deterjs]
undesirable behavior." Id; see also Presumed Guilty, supra note 38, at 30 (estimated cost
of litigation to society does not "take [into] account [ the indirect benefits [of litigation],
such as product safety").
41. See Presumed Guilty, supra note 38, at 30.
42. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici).
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is] suffering from hyperlexia, a serious disease caused by an excessive
reliance on law and lawyers. It is pervasive throughout our society but
has reached epidemic dimensions in the court-created private actions
brought under section 10(b) of the ['34 Act]."143 He also describes the
adverse effects meritless securities litigation has on society which, not
surprisingly, mirror the predicted effects of a general litigation
explosion.'
Similar to the debate over whether the country is experiencing a litiga-
tion explosion, whether there has been an "explosion" in Rule lOb-5 liti-
gation is also heatedly contested. Opponents of reform argue that the
number of Rule lOb-5 cases brought in federal courts has actually de-
clined in recent years.45 In addition, the recent success of the capital
markets in raising funds for new issues counters the arguments of those
asserting that a Rule lOb-5 explosion is hindering capital formation.46
B. The Class Action Controversy: Problems of Class
Supporters of Rule lOb-5 reform assert that under current principles of
securities litigation, the settlement values of meritless suits are identical
to meritorious ones. 7 Such conditions encourage frivolous litigation be-
cause the incentive for a plaintiff to bring a meritless securities fraud suit
43. Id. For a discussion of the derivation of the word "hyperlexia," see Galanter,
supra note 27, at 4 n.4.
44. Excessive securities litigation hinders competition and chills innovation. See 138
Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen. Domenici). "Everyone
says they care about competitiveness, yet if we don't stop this destructive trend, the only
manufacturing preeminence the United States may enjoy is the world renowned ability to
manufacture lawsuits." Id. at S12,601 (statements of Sen. Domenici).
45. See William Lerach, The Claims Made By Senator Domenici On The Senate Floor
Are False 1 (1992) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Lerach argues that since the
Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987), the number of suits in federal courts predicated on violations of Rule lOb-5
have declined. In McMahon, the Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement be-
tween a broker and customer was enforceable even where the arbitrable controversy in-
volved allegations of violations of § 10(b) of the '34 Act. See id. at 238. The customer
had argued that the agreement was unenforceable because it violated § 29(a) of the '34
Act which voids any agreement that waives compliance with a provision of the Act. See
id. at 228. The customer argued that since § 27 of the '34 Act gave the district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over violations of § 10(b), § 10(b) claims could not be arbitrated
rendering the arbitration agreement void. See id. The Court rejected this claim looking
to the Federal Arbitration Act's, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1307 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991), strong policy
of encouraging arbitration of disputes. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225-26. Courts should
uphold arbitration agreements in disputes involving violations of § 10(b) because "the
SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is adequate to vindicate
Exchange Act rights." Id. at 238.
46. See William Lerach, The Claims Made By Senator Domenici on The Senate Floor
Are False 4 (1992). Lerach argues that the record number of initial public offerings over
the past few years debunks claims that excessive Rule lob-5 suits are hindering capital
formation. In 1992, initial public stock offerings raised a record $39.4 billion. Many
observers believe that this record setting trend will continue. See Sara Calian, 1PO's
Raise A Record $39.4 Billion For '92, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1993 at C1.
47. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992).
S358 [Vol. 61
EFFORTS AT RULE 10b-5 REFORM
is the same as the incentive to bring a meritorious one.4" To bolster these
assertions, supporters of reform refer to a recent study published in the
Stanford Law Review. 9 This article argues that securities suits that take
the form of a class action have a predisposition toward abusive litigation
because the merits of such cases are irrelevant.' The study does not,
however, single out litigation under Rule lOb-5, nor does it support
sweeping reform of Rule lOb-5. The abuses and deleterious conse-
quences associated with class action litigation nonetheless have been
inappropriately cited as support for Rule lOb-5 reform."' A discussion of
the abuses long associated with securities class action litigation is neces-
sary in order to identify the origins of some of the arguments made in
support of Rule lOb-5 reform.
1. Benefits of a Class Action
A class action allows an individual whose damages are insufficient to
justify the costs of a solitary suit to join his or her claim with other vic-
tims of the same fraud. 2 Only one suit is then instituted on behalf of the
joined claims. Legal fees are paid out of the award of damages if the class
is successful.5 3 By spreading the costs of the litigation across a group of
plaintiffs, the class action promotes the prosecution of claims that would
otherwise go unprosecuted s4 Consequently, the threat of a class action
lawsuit heightens the vigilance of would be defendants.55
These features of a class action make it a particularly appropriate form
of litigation under the securities laws. As noted above, the securities laws
rely upon the enforcement efforts of individual plaintiffs. By facilitating
such efforts, the class action promotes the enforcement of the securities
laws. Similarly, by heightening the vigilance of would be defendants, the
class action furthers the goals of the securities laws by encouraging those
involved in securities transactions to maintain a higher standard of con-
duct. The importance of the class action to securities fraud litigation has
been described as "essential to the integrity of our financial markets. 56
48. See id.
49. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
50. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
51. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici); 138 Cong. Rec. E2,463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Rep. Tauzin).
52. See Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 16.1, at 722 (1985).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See William Lerach, Counterpoint Class Action Suits Help Keep Predators Away,
San Jose Bus. J., May 25, 1992, at 7. William Lerach is a prominent class action plain-
tiff's attorney. He has argued forcefully the importance of class action litigation. By
highlighting the recent well publicized scandals on Wall Street, including "[t]he scandals
involving Drexel Burnham Lambert, Michael Milken, Ivan Boesky, Charles Keating,
BCCI and the Treasury markets, and a disturbing number of the nation's savings and
loans," he has asserted that now is an inappropriate time to seek reforms that would
curtail private enforcement of the securities laws. Id.
56. Id.
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2. Problems Associated With Class Action Litigation
Notwithstanding the benefits of a class action, courts and commenta-
tors have criticized this form of litigation as embodying a danger of ex-
tortion.57 Because the individual damages of members in a class are
aggregated, the damages sought in a class action can be exorbitant. A
defendant who faces the hazard of class action damages must choose be-
tween settlement for a fixed amount or face the caprice of a jury verdict.
The Supreme Court acknowledged this danger58 in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores,59 a class action Rule lOb-5 securities fraud suit.
There, the Court stated that, "litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a dan-
ger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which ac-
companies litigation in general.... The very pendency of the lawsuit
may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant which is
totally unrelated to the lawsuit."' By this statement, the Court accepted
the theory that "nuisance actions give plaintiff's attorneys extortionate
leverage over defendants."'"
The issue of whether class action litigation consists disproportionately
of frivolous suits has been a "theme long debated in the legal litera-
ture."62 Anecdotal evidence suggesting that settlement values in class
action litigation do not reflect the merits of a case has existed for some
time.63 Only recently, however, has a statistical study appeared to sup-
port that assertion.
In 1991, the Stanford Law Review released a seminal article by Profes-
sor Janet Cooper Alexander, wherein she analyzed the seventeen com-
puter-related companies that made initial public offerings ("IPO's") in
1983.4 Twelve of these companies subsequently experienced precipitous
declines in their stock price.65 Of these twelve, nine were sued in class
actions alleging securities fraud.66 Six of the suits settled for between 20
and 27.5% of the damages sought. The three other cases had settlements
outside of this range due to special circumstances. The study concludes
that "the most likely explanation for the similarity of outcomes [of the
57. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975).
58. See id. at 739-40.
59. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
60. Id. at 739-40. The case involved a class action Rule lOb-5 suit and the Court's
statement was directed at the abuses of the attorneys who represent the class. Thus the
statement was not an indictment of all Rule lob-5 suits. See John C. Coffee, Jr., supra
note 14, at 670-71 n.3.
61. Coffee, supra note 14, at 670-71 n.3.
62. Id. at 673.
63. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Suspect Settlements In Securities Litigation, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 28, 1991, at 5.
64. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements In
Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 487, 517 (1991).
65. See id. at 511.
66. See id.
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six settled suits] is that the merits did not affect the settlement
amounts. 67
This conclusion suggests that where the merits do not matter in class
action settlements a dangerous incentive for vexatious litigation exists.
Under such a system, the incentive to bring meritless suits is identical to
the incentive to bring meritorious ones because each is likely to settle for
approximately the same percentage of the damages sought. The cumula-
tive result of this phenomenon is that likely defendants, i.e., the account-
ing firms and banks, will be reluctant to service clients in high risk
industries where stock prices are particularly volatile.6" And, again, be-
cause it is the incipient companies whose stock prices are often the most
volatile, these companies will find it more difficult to raise capital in the
markets.69 Although these conclusions seem to support reform of Rule
lOb-5,70 their validity is suspect for the following reasons. First, Profes-
sor Alexander's analysis involved a study of class actions that were not
predicated exclusively on violations of Rule lOb-5. The cases were also
predicated on violations of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 1-a
critical distinction.72 Under section 11, an issuer of securities is held
strictly liable for material misstatements and must prove nonnegli-
gence.73 Thus, in contrast to Rule lOb-5, actions under section 11 often
render the usual facts of a case irrelevant.7 4 It is therefore not surprising
67. Id. at 523. This conflicts with an economic analysis of settlement behavior which
posits that the settlement value of a case is a function of the merits of a case, i.e.,
probability of success, multiplied by the damages sought. See id. at 509 n.36; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Suspect Settlements in Securities Litigation, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 28, 1991, at 5;
George L. Preist & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes For Litigation, 13 J. Legal
Stud. 1, 7 (1984).
68. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,600-01 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a) (1988). Section 11 provides an express statutory remedy
to persons who acquired securities issued under a registration statement that contained
an untrue statement of a material fact or that omitted to state a material fact required to
be stated. See id.
72. See Alexander, supra note 64, at 509 n.36 (all the suits alleged that the offering
documents did not provide adequate disclosure and the "legal theories included claims
for violations of federal securities laws, section I 1 ... and Rule lOb-5").
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1988); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
381-82 (1983); In re Wonder Worlds, No. C 87-5491 SC, 1993 WL 63940, at *28 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 20, 1993); Chang v. Moon, No. Civ. 92-733-MA, 1992 WL 420866, at 01 (D.
Or. Oct. 21, 1992); Moore v. Keegen Management Co., 794 F. Supp. 939, 946 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
74. Other defendants, like the accountants who certified the registration statement,
are presumed to be liable. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) (1988). This presumption, however,
can be rebutted by a showing of nonnegligence. See id Although facts are generally
irrelevant in cases where § 11 is used against issuers, facts are relevant where plaintiffs
assert a § 11 violation against accountants. Because the cases included in Professor Alex-
ander's study included § 11 claims against both issuers and accountants, the facts may
not have been completely irrelevant. They would likely have been relevant to the claims
against the accountants. Nonetheless, Professor Alexander's conclusions are precarious
since she extrapolates from a group of defendants, some of whom faced strict liability, to
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to see similar settlement values in these cases.7"
Second, even assuming that the study is accurate, and securities fraud
class actions predicated on violations of Rule lOb-5 are for the most part
frivolous in nature, such a conclusion supports reform of class action
litigation in general, not Rule lOb-5 litigation in particular. Because
class actions constituted only fifteen to twenty percent of all securities
litigation in 1991,76 reforms that fail to distinguish between class actions
and individual actions cut too wide a swath.77 Such wide sweeping re-
forms engender a risk that they will diminish the effectiveness of the se-
curities laws by inhibiting the function of private attorneys general upon
which our securities markets so heavily rely.7 8
a situation where the facts of the cases were relevant. This leap facilitates the conclusion
that the merits of the cases were likely irrelevant to their settlement values.
75. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Suspect Settlements In Securities Litigation, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 28, 1991, at 5. The economic theory of settlement behavior posits that the settle-
ment value of a particular suit is a function of the "expected award if the plaintiff wins
and the probability of a plaintiff's verdict." Alexander, supra note 64, at 503. These two
variables, in turn, are "functions of the expected strength of plaintiff's proof on the mer-
its." Id. Two cases seeking the same amount in damages will have identical settlement
values only if their merits are identical. See id. at 514. The merits of two cases, however,
are almost never the same. This is true because for two cases to have identical merits,
"the [defendants'] degree[s] of culpability and the evidence available to prove it [must be]
equal." Id. Such a conincidence is unlikely. Even if the facts of two cases are identical,
the probability of success at trial will be affected by other factors that a jury may subcon-
sciously consider, such as counsels' and the client's courtroom appearance. See id. at
503-04 n.14. Where strict liability is at issue, however, the number of variables that may
affect the merits of the case are circumscribed. Under § 11, the relevant inquiry is
whether the registration statement contained a material misstatement-not whether de-
fendants' acted with the necessary culpable intent. Thus, two cases seeking the same
amount in damages under § 11 may have similar settlement values.
76. See Richard Y. Roberts, Gridlock on Securities Law, Legal Times, Feb. 3, 1992, at
22 (quoting from statements of SEC chairman, Richard C. Breeden).
77. Professor Alexander recognizes the difficulties inherent in reforming procedural
rules for litigation. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Set-
tlements In Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 487, 587-88 (1991). Specifically, she
notes that procedural rules are "trans-substantive"-meaning procedural rule changes
will likely affect areas of litigation that are not problematic. See id. at 588. For example,
some have suggested lowering the summary judgment standards of Rule 56 to enable
courts to dispose of abusive class action suits. See id. at 587. Professor Alexander, how-
ever, cautions against such a procedural change because it could not be contained to class
action litigation and "would be equally applicable to other sorts of cases in which there is
no reason to believe that summary judgment or settlement work poorly-including secur-
ities cases that are not brought as class actions." Id. Substantive changes, like defining
scienter and materiality more restrictively, embody similar dangers. See id. at 588.
78. In addition, suggestions that Rule lob-5 class action litigation hinders the intro-
duction of new products by blocking new companies' access to capital markets is reminis-
cent of claims made by the supporters of general litigation reform. Once again, they
appear unsupported in light of the boom in initial public offerings ("IPO's") of stock over
the past few years. The rise in the number of IPO's in the past few years runs counter to
assertions in Professor Alexander's study and of proponents of reform that meritless liti-
gation is inhibiting the raising of capital on the markets. Indeed, the period between 1986
and 1991 "has seen a 'going public' boom which has raised billions [of dollars] in capital
[.. (and t]hese actual results are totally inconsistent with any notion that abusive securi-
ties litigation is stifling the raising of capital or creation of new public companies." Wil-
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C. Supporters of Reforn. Irony in Self-Interest
The most ardent supporters of reform consist of those organizations
who, because of their deep pockets and their involvement in almost all
types of securities transactions, are frequent and likely targets of securi-
ties fraud actions. Among these organizations are securities issuers, in-
surance companies, large banking institutions, and accounting firms.
These organizations have joined together to form the Coalition to Elimi-
nate Abusive Securities Suits ("CEASS"), a lobby group consisting of
approximately 300 corporate, accounting, and financial institutions, 9
created to press Congress to reform Rule lOb-5. Indeed, CEASS played
an "'active role'" in drafting the reform legislation."0
Of the organizations that comprise CEASS, the accounting industry is
the most vocal and, perhaps, the most in need of reform because it is
facing a self-declared "liability crisis. '"' The increase in litigation
against accounting firms raises concerns regarding the continued vitality
of many of the largest accounting firms.8 2 By mid-1992, accountants
faced more than 4000 suits and over $15 billion in damages and legal
expenses.8 3 In 1991 alone, the "Big Six" accounting firms" spent nearly
$500 million, or nine percent of their revenues and sixteen percent of
partners' capital, defending and settling these suits.8 5 In addition, their
insurance premiums have risen precipitously 6 as a result of the increased
1am Lerach, Vho Wants to Curtail Private Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws
and Why? 2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review); see also
Richard C. Breeden, Remarks at Corporate Counsel Institute 2 (Oct. 16, 1991) (tran-
script on file with the Fordham Law Review); Guy Halverson, Securities Firms Dub 1992
Dandy, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 6, 1993, at 9 ("The United States securities industry
turned out to be one of the big winners in 1992.... Most analysts here attribute the
industry's current success to three main factors [including] [a] strong IPO market: Com-
panies issued a record $ 39.4 billion worth of new stock offerings... last year."); Kathy
M. Kristof, Companies Creating Investment Frenzy By Going Public, Atlanta J. & Const.,
Jan. 11, 1993, at E2 ("Little companies are 'going public' at a record rate.").
79. See Securities Suits Reform Bill Lauded by Business Coalition, PR Newswire,
Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File.
80. Bills Introduced in Both Houses to Curb Securities Fraud Litigation, 24 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1442 (Sept. 4, 1992) (quoting spokeswoman for CEASS).
81. See Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., supra note 21.
82. See Lee Berton, Investors Call CPAs to Account, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 30
(proliferation of liability suits is beginning to erode the financial health of the largest
accounting firms); Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., supra note 21.
83. See Thomas McCarroll, Who's Counting?, Time, Apr. 13, 1992, at 48.
84. The "Big-Six" accounting firms are Arthur Andersen & Co.; Coopers & Lybrand;
Deloitte & Touche; Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse.
85. See Lee Berton, Inventory Chicanery Tempts More Firms, Fools More Auditors,
Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1992, at Al, A4 [hereinafter Inventory Chicanery]; Dennis J. Block &
Jonathan M. Hoff, Defining the Limits ofAccountants'Liability, N.Y. UJ., Oct. 15, 1992,
at 5, 7 n.3.
86. See McCarroll, supra note 83, at 48; Campaign for Tort Reform, World Ins. Rep.,
Sept. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (reporting that "[n]inety-
six per cent[sic] of those firms with more than 50 certified public accountants reported
increased exposure to liability and the same group had experienced a 300% increase in
liability insurance premiums since 1985").
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incidence of securities litigation.
Accounting firms' interest in litigation reform, arguably, is based upon
an instinctual effort toward self-preservation. Rule lOb-5 reform, how-
ever, is merely a cosmetic, short-sighted remedy to liability troubles ac-
countants have faced for decades. Focusing on Rule lOb-5 reform, as
will be seen, fails to address the underlying causes of increased litigation
against accounting firms and creates a troubling paradox. While en-
gendering the possibility of short term relief from litigation, Rule 1Ob-5
reform may concomitantly diminish the credibility of the accounting
profession in the long-run.
1. Accountant Independence
Accountants perform duties that are essential to the efficient function-
ing of our free market system. 7 Financial statements audited by ac-
countants provide information that is used by investors in the securities
markets to accurately assess the value of particular enterprises. 8  The
accuracy of financial statements "is essential to the efficient use and ex-
change of property." 9 The accountant's duties are suffused with public
trust and public purpose; the auditor serves as guardian of economic and
political freedom.90 Indeed, as watchdog of the public interest, an audi-
tor's duty to the public is paramount and "takes precedence over any
duty to the client." 91
To fulfill their duties to the public, accountants must perform their
audits with "independence." The "independent audit" is a metonymy
associating the auditor's duties with "integrity, honesty, and objectiv-
ity." 92 Accountants are guided by rules proscribing certain relationships
that jeopardize their independence. 93 For example, they may not hold a
financial interest, whether direct or indirect, in their clients.94
Rules and regulations of conduct, however, merely create a semblance
of independence; they fall short of creating independence in fact. Indeed,
the relationship between auditor and client precludes complete indepen-
dence. Because clients hire and pay auditors, financial ties inextricably
bind the auditor to the client. Increased competition among auditors in-
tensifies the auditor's attachment to the client. Such an environment
87. See Denzil Y. Causey, Jr., Duties and Liabilities of Public Accountants 1 (1982).
88. See id. (citing Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. I (1977)).
89. Id. at 1.
90. See id. at 1-2. Auditors prevent corporations from making illegal bribes and cam-
paign contributions and thus prevent the loss of political freedom. See id.
91. Id. at 2; see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984)
("By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status,
the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client.").
92. Causey, supra note 87, at 25.
93. See id. at 25-26.
94. See id. at 26.
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jeopardizes the auditor's ability to adhere to rules which require the audi-
tor to focus on fulfilling both their duties to the public and to their cli-
ents.9" Auditors must then either adhere to rules of conduct prescribed
to ensure independence and most likely lose business or sacrifice indepen-
dence for self-preservation.
In the past, auditors' conflicts concerning independence from their cli-
ents subjected them to increased liability. During the 1960s, accounting
firms faced increased liability and diminished credibility in the eyes of the
public, for their "[failure] to give clear warning of impending disaster or
to discover massive fraud."' 96 Critics argued that auditors should be held
accountable to investors for losses resulting from misrepresentations in
financial statements. 97 In the mid-1970s, Congress began investigations
to uncover the causes of accountant failures to detect client abuses.98
Those investigations revealed two underlying causes. First, auditors
lacked independence from their clients due to financial ties.99 Second,
auditors lacked uniformity in their financial reporting standards." ' Such
issues and conflicts of the past persist today.
2. Current Difficulties Caused by Lack of Independence
Current accountant liability troubles mirror those of the past. In a
most recent and telling address to the American Accounting Association,
Walter P. Schuetze, the chief accountant for the SEC, cited increased
competition, lack of independence, and problems with financial reporting
standards as the underlying causes for the current rise in litigation
against accountants.101 Moreover, he argued that recent efforts towards
Rule lOb-5 reform do not address these problems:
[Tihe profession, with a few exceptions, is not doing anything about
95. See idL at 2.
96. Id at 3. Compare these criticisms of the accounting industry with recent criti-
cism of the accountant's role in the savings and loan scandal. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
97. See Causey, supra note 87, at 3.
98. See id. at 5.
99. See id.
100. See id. Specific examples of lapses in independence include auditors engaging in
lobbying efforts on behalf of their clients and auditors exercising control of a corpora-
tion's financial management. See id. at 6.
101. See Walter P. Schuetze, Relevance and Credibility in Financial Accounting and
Reporting 10-11, Address Before the American Accounting Association (Aug. 12, 1992)
(transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review). For support of the notion that ac-
counting firms have experienced increased competition, see Inventory Chicanery, supra
note 85, at A4. The slumping economy over the past few years forced accounting firms to
give their clients audit-fee concessions. These concessions reduced accounting firms' rev-
enues and the firms responded by cutting expenses through lay-offs of employees. Some
have attributed accounting firms' widespread failure to detect inventory fraud to these
developments. See id. at A4; Lee Berton, Auditor Changes by Public Companies Set High
as Accountants Compete More, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 12 (record number of publicly
traded companies changed auditors last year and competition is up); Lee Berton, Inves-
tors Call CPAs to Account, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 30.
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the underlying causes of litigation against itself. It will not pull on its
own bootstraps. The profession will not go to its clients and tell those
clients that their balance sheets have to have realism in order to elicit
unqualified opinions. Why not?... Maybe the client will go across
the street to another auditing firm and that firm will agree to report on
a balance sheet that has outdated or irrelevant representations in it.10 2
Similarly, the General Accounting Office has cited a lack of auditor inde-
pendence as an underlying cause of the rise in litigation against account-
ants in the wake of the demise of the savings and loan industry.10 3 Once
again, a lack of independence and accurate financial reporting standards
give rise to accountant liability.
Current efforts to reform Rule lOb-5 are not a panacea for problems
that have plagued the accounting industry for decades."° Such a short-
sighted remedy would be ineffectual, for it fails to address the underlying
issues of accounting liability-auditor independence and accurate report-
ing standards.
III. DISCUSSION OF THREE SUGGESTED REFORMS
The discussion above raises doubts concerning the underlying premises
of Rule lOb-5 reform. In addition to faulty premises, the specific reform
proposals are controversial. Indeed, courts and commentators have ad-
dressed the majority of the reforms suggested, either in the context of
securities litigation or in other areas. The rationales for past reluctance
to adopt these reforms retain their persuasiveness today. The proposed
reforms of fee shifting, proportionate liability, and a higher burden of
proof all share at least two characteristics that continue to make each
unattractive: all embody the danger that they will increase the litigation
burdens carried by plaintiffs; and all embody the danger of hindering
private enforcement of the securities laws.
A. Attorney Fee Shifting
Generally, under current principles of securities litigation, each side
102. Schuetze, supra note 101, at 10; see also Inventory Chicanery, supra note 85, at A4
(according to Howard Schilit, an associate professor of accounting at American Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C., "'With their jobs in peril, remaining auditors are less likely to
make waves for fear of losing a client and possibly their jobs.' ").
103. See McCarroll, supra note 83, at 49. Accountants often failed to provide in-
dependent verification of management claims that problem loans were collectible. This is
similar to the criticisms that the financial industry, media, and general public directed at
accounting firms over 30 years ago. See supra text accompanying note 96.
104. In a joint position paper, the Big-Six acknowledged that Rule lob-5 reform would
not solve their liability troubles since less than one third of the securities fraud claims
filed against them contained Rule lob-5 claims. Of those claims, less than 10% were
exclusively claims under Rule lob-5. See Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., supra note 21, at
6. Moreover, the accounting firms cited state liability laws as providing the greatest
source of liability exposure and the greatest threat to the future viability of the accounting
profession. See id. at 7.
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pays its own litigation costs. This is known as the "American rule."" °5
The proposed reforms have provisions for fee shifting that are variations
on what is known as the "English Rule."°6 Under the English Rule, the
loser pays the winner's litigation costs. 7 The bills propose that after
filing a motion, the prevailing party shall recover reasonable attorney fees
and costs from the losing party."' To mitigate the harshness of auto-
matic fee shifting, the reforms exempt claims that courts determine to be
"substantially justified.""' 9
The stated purpose of the fee shifting provision is to create "adequate
incentive for evaluating the merits of a case prior to filing and to create
disincentives for filing meritless securities fraud lawsuits."1"0 Economic
studies of fee shifting arrangements have concluded that fee shifting
achieves these goals by increasing the risks associated with litigation and
thereby discouraging frivolous claims."' It is also generally accepted,
however, that fee shifting discourages meritorious claims as well."'
1. The Fee Shifting Debate
Debate over the saliency of attorney fee shifting has resounded in this
country for at least two hundred years. The arguments for and against
fee shifting have been relatively consistent. One side argues the need to
prevent wily plaintiffs from using litigation as a nuisance device or for
extortionate purposes. The other side aserts the need to encourage reso-
lution of legitimate disputes through judicial disposition.' 13
105. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc. 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Rox-
anne Barton Conlin & Clarence L. King, Jr., The 'Loser Pays' Rule." Who Pays For Injus-
tice?, Trial, Oct. 1992, at 58, 58. In class action suits, however, the attorneys' fees for the
class may be paid out of the damage award to the class. This is known as the "common
fund" doctrine. Alternatively, the class attorneys' fees may be paid by contingency fee
arrangements. Although statutory fee shifting exists in other areas of litigation and in
fact may be as common as the traditional American Rule, there is no statutory, automatic
fee shifting under the securities laws. See Coffee, supra note 14, at 670 n.2.
106. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 55.
107. See id; Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, 'Loser Pays'--Attorneys'
Fees in England, Germany, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 15, 1992, at 3, 3.
108. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(b) (1993).
109. See id
110. S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(b)(2) (1992).
111. See Coffee, supra note 14, at 720-21 n.138.
112. See id; Kritzer, supra note 106, at 55.
113. An analogue to the debate over attorney fee awards is the debate over adoption of
Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 admonishes a person contemplating
submitting a paper to the court that their signature on such a paper certifies that it is not
frivolous but is "well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
Where Rule 11 is violated, the court must sanction the person who signed the paper, or a
representative, or both. The sanction can consist of an order to pay the other party rea-
sonable attorneys' fees and costs. See id. One commentator succinctly summed up that
debate in the following way:
[T]he sanctions debate is a distributional political battle that has some unavoid-
able aspects of a zero-sum game. If Rule 11 is written or interpreted strin-
gently, some claims are sacrificed in the name of efficiency, deterring the
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The Supreme Court took sides in this debate when it decided against
fee shifting almost two hundred years ago.' 14 Recognizing the chilling
effects fee shifting would have on meritorious suits, the Court rejected
the English Rule and stated that "[t]he general practice of the United
States is in oposition [sic] to [the English Rule].""'  The Court clarified
its reasoning almost two centuries later by stating that under the English
Rule a person "might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to
vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponents' counsel."" ' 6
2. "Substantially Justified" Standard
Under the proposed reforms, claims that a court determines to be
"substantially justified" are exempted from fee shifting treatment." 17 The
proposed reforms adopt the "substantially justified" standard from the
Equal Access to Justice Act of 1985 ("EAJA")."18 Proponents of reform
argue that this standard introduces an element of judicial discretion into
the fee shifting statute. Such discretion is said to mitigate the harshness
of straight fee shifting.
Applying the "substantially justified" standard to securities litigation
is problematic for a number of reasons. First, the circumstances that
motivated Congress to design and enact the "substantially justified" stan-
dard under the EAJA do not exist in most cases under securities litiga-
tion. Congress designed the "substantially justified" standard to balance
the significant litigation advantages a governmental unit enjoyed over in-
dividual and small business adversaries.' ' 9 While a governmental unit
could sustain the high costs of litigation, individual and small business
defendants-with their limited financial resources---could not. Thus,
Congress implemented fee shifting under the EAJA to enable individuals
and small businesses adequately to defend their rights in litigation
against the Government. 20  Consistent with the Act's concerns for pro-
tecting those individuals and businesses with limited financial means,
only those litigants with a net worth of less than $2 million qualify under
EAJA's fee shifting provision. 2'
unfounded or abusive, and thinning court dockets. If Rule 1 's text or applica-
tion is made more forgiving, some of these values are sacrificed in favor of zeal-
ous advocacy, innovative lawyering, and claimants' rights.
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of
Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre- Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 257,
260-61 (1991).
114. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306, 306 (1796).
115. Id. (emphasis in original).
116. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
117. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(b) (1993).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1985).
119. See Donald J. Kinlin & Michael T. Kavanaugh, A Current Guide To Recovery
Under The Equal Access To Justice Act 3 (1989).
120. See id.
121. See id. app. C at 7.
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Ironically, those who support application of the "substantially justi-
fied" standard to securities litigation are parties, like the Government,
who in the majority of cases may enjoy significant litigation-cost advan-
tages over individual plaintiffs. 11 Unlike the individuals of limited finan-
cial means which the EAJA protects, those arguing for Rule lOb-5
reform are not in need of similar protections.'23
A second difficulty with the "substantially justified" standard is that it
may produce additional litigation. As noted above, fee shifting in securi-
ties litigation is designed to deter frivolous claims and trim excess litiga-
tion. 24 Reformers hope that attorneys will look to the EAJA to
determine how the courts have interpreted the term "substantially justi-
fied" and will screen their cases accordingly. Contrary to the goals of
litigation reform, the proposed fee shifting provision and its "substan-
tially justified" standard in particular will likely produce increased litiga-
tion.125 Additional sources of litigation emanating from the fee shifting
provision will likely center around the definition of "prevailing plain-
tiff' 26 and "reasonable" attorney fees and costs.,12
B. Proportionate Liability
Some supporters of reform attribute the primary cause of litigation
abuse to the doctrine of joint and several liability.'2 Under current law,
a court that finds a defendant guilty of violating Rule 1Ob-5 will hold that
defendant jointly and severally liable for all of a plaintiff's damages.' 29
Accordingly, each defendant is responsible for the entire amount of dam-
ages caused by the violation-regardless of degree of fault. 3 ° Reformers
assert that joint and several liability enables a plaintiff to settle against
one defendant to pursue litigation against a "deep pocket" joint
tortfeasor."' The deep pocket defendant must then face the prospect of
shouldering all the costs of defense and the burden of full liability in the
case of an adverse judgment. In such a situation, the defendant may
have no choice but to settle and avoid the risk of facing the caprice of a
122. Nearly 80% of all securities fraud claims involve individuals as plaintiffs. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
123. Indeed, the reforms are silent about a net worth limitation similar to the one
under the EAJA.
124. See S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
125. See Kinlin & Kavanaugh, supra note 119, at 46.
126. For example, how many issues must the plaintiff win? How much of the damages
sought by the plaintiff must the court award? See id. at 45-46.
127. See id.
128. See Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., supra note 21, at 6.
129. See Arnold S. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule l0b-5, § 260.03[1 (2d
ed. 1992).
130. See id. For a brief account of the genesis ofjoint and several liability, see Michael
Hoenig, Products Liability: Substantive, Procedural and Policy Issues 421-22 (1992)(tracing the doctrine of joint and several liability back to a Lord Mansfield opinion in an
18th century English case).
131. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 Aug. 12, 1992 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements
of Sen. Domenici); Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., supra note 21, at 6.
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jury. Equity, it is argued, compels the use of proportionate liability be-
cause joint and several liability may result in a less culpable defendant
paying more than a more culpable defendant.' 32
In response to these concerns, reformers propose replacing joint and
several liability with proportionate liability.13 3 Under such a proposal, a
defendant who is found to have violated Rule lOb-5 will be held jointly
and severally liable only where the defendant "engaged in knowing
securities fraud."' 134  To constitute a "knowing" securities fraud, the
defendant must "know[] that other persons are likely to rely on that
misrepresentation or omission."' 31 In the absence of "knowing securities
fraud," each defendant will be held liable for the damages attributable to
his or her respective degree of culpability, rather than for the full amount
of damages. 136 Furthermore, the reforms expressly exclude reckless con-
duct from joint and several liability. 37 By excluding reckless conduct
from the purview of joint and several liability, the bills provide added
security to repeat defendants since the liability of these defendants is
often established by a showing of scienter predicated upon
recklessness. 
38
While principles of equity are said to support proportionate liability, in
fact, equity compels the full retention of joint and several liability in se-
curities fraud litigation. Joint and several liability has been a consistent
common-law tort principle because it appropriately balances the interests
132. See 138 Cong. Rec. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statements of Sen.
Domenici); Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., supra note 21, at 6. Arguments for abrogating
joint and several liability are not new and have appeared as suggested reforms in other
areas of litigation such as products liability. See Hoenig, supra note 130, at 419-23 (1992)
(describing certain "tensions" in product liability litigation caused by "massive uncer-
tainty" concerning trial outcomes; "the upward spiral of [damage] awards"; and the de-
bate in product liability "over the last fifteen years" concerning whether products liability
is ... a system of fault determination or a compensation scheme," and arguing that one
way to "fairly, simply and rationally alter many of the foregoing sources of tension in one
dramatic and meaningful way [would be to] abolish the doctrine of 'joint and several
liability.' ").
133. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1993).
134. Id. Currently, defendants are jointly and severally liable if they act with scienter,
i.e., when they "intentionally or knowingly engage[ ] in the prohibited activities, or acts
with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a material statement." SEC v. Electron-
ics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 59 (D. Conn. 1988) (citations omitted), aff'd, 891
F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3228 (1990). Under the proposed re-
forms, a defendant engages in knowing securities fraud in two possible ways. Knowing
securities fraud is defined as either a "material representation with actual knowledge that,
the representation is false" or as an omission, "with actual knowledge that as a result of
the omission, one of [defendant's] material representations is false." H.R. 417, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1993).
135. H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1993).
136. See id.
137. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
138. See Van Dyke v. Coburn Enterprises, Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989)
(noting that "[t]he majority rule in the Courts of Appeals is that recklessness satisfies
[the] scienter requirement").
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of victim and tortfeasor.139 The typical Rule lOb-5 case illustrates this
balance. To establish liability a plaintiff must show that the defendant
acted culpably with scienter. 1 Once plaintiffs establish liability, they
can then recover the full damages from any culpable defendant, regard-
less of that defendant's degree of fault. A defendant who is found jointly
and severally liable, however, is, in most cases, not relegated to paying
more than her or his fair share of the damages. Under the doctrine of
contribution, such a defendant usually can recover any amounts paid to
plaintiff in excess of that defendant's degree of fault.' 4 '
In the case where defendants pay more than their proportionate share
of damages and are unable to recover from an impecunious joint defend-
ant, the equities are still in favor of joint and several liability. In such a
case, if proportionate liability were the rule, the innocent plaintiff would
bear the loss.142 By contrast, under joint and several liability, the culpa-
ble defendant bears the loss. This is clearly the more equitable result
because equity favors the innocent over the culpable.
139. See Arnold S. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5, § 260.03bj] (2d
ed. 1992).
140. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.23 (1983); Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
ston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
141. See Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 577-80 (9th Cir.),
cert granted, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992); Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 232 (1990); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334
(7th Cir. 1979) (right of contribution exists under section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule
lOb-5 promulgated thereunder); In re Nucorp Energy Securities Litigation, 661 F. Supp.
1403, 1406 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (court assumes, without deciding, that where an implied
private right of action for violation of the federal securities laws exists, a right to contri-
bution also exists); Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 550 (D. Colo.
1989); In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Nel-
son v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (E.D. Cal. 1987). But see Chutich v. Green Tree
Acceptance, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1403, 1407 (D. Minn. 1988) (no implied right of contribu-
tion exists under § 10(b) of the '34 Act); In re Professional Financial Management, Ltd.,
683 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (D. Minn. 1988) (same). The Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari to resolve this conflict in the jurisdictions. See Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler &
Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 577-80 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992). Even in
those jurisdiction holding that a right to contribution exists under Rule 1Ob-5, that right
may not extend to contribution from defendants who had settled on condition that the
court approve a settlement bar order prohibiting contribution from the settling defend-
ants. See Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1232. To be effective, however, the settlement bar order
must "limit the subsequent exposure of the nonsettling defendants [to the] actual percent-
age of liability for the amount of total damages determined at trial." Id. Thus, even
where a settlement bar order precludes contribution from settling defendants, the nonset-
fling defendants who are jointly and severally liable for their combined share of liability
may seek contribution from each other. See id. at 1231.
142. But see Hoenig, supra note 130, at 423 (Hoenig argues for abolition of joint and
several liability in the context of products liability litigation even in cases where one
defendant is insolvent because "when one plaintiff sues one defendant, plaintiff bears the
risk of the defendant being insolventl] [therefore, 'o]n what basis does the risk shift if
there are two defendants and one is insolvent?'" (quoting Bartlett v. New Mexico Weld-
ing Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 585 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982)). A response to this argument
is simply that equity provides a basis for shifting the risk of insolvency onto a culpable
party.
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C. A Change in the Burden of Proof Standard
Finally, reformers propose a change in the burden of proof standard
applicable in Rule lOb-5 litigation.143 Generally, a plaintiff in a Rule
lOb-5 action must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant acted with scienter.11 Reforms would heighten the burden of
proof from a preponderance of the evidence standard to one requiring
clear and convincing evidence.' 45
The clear and convincing evidence standard governs common-law
fraud. 146 Because the clear and convincing evidence standard is a height-
ened standard of proof, securities fraud will be more difficult to prove.
This more rigorous standard will likely deter plaintiffs from filing frivo-
lous claims.
There is, however, a danger in looking to common-law fraud as a para-
digm for the establishment of a heightened burden of proof in Rule 1Ob-5
fraud cases. Such a comparison deemphasizes significant differences in
the natures of the two causes of action.' 47  Indeed, in Herman &
143. See H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1993).
144. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983).
145. A burden of proof standard instructs fact finders as to the certainty with which
they should come to their decisions. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring). Generally, there are three standards of proof. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). They are, from the most lenient to the most onerous,
the following: the preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Courts choose the standard to apply in
specific cases based upon the importance society places on the ultimate decision. See id.
at 423-24. For example, society places a heightened importance upon protecting the
rights of a criminal defendants because the consequences of an erroneous verdict are so
great. Therefore, courts have instructed juries that a criminal defendant must be found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-the heaviest burden. See id. Conversely, society
places a lower value upon the outcomes of monetary disputes. Courts have therefore
chosen to allocate the risk of error between the two parties through application of the
preponderance of the evidence standard to these actions. See id. at 423. The clear and
convincing evidence standard falls in between. Courts have applied it to cases that have
elements of both criminal and monetary suits. The clearest example is the case of com-
mon-law fraud. Although the fraud defendant faces a pecuniary penalty, the interests at
stake in a fraud case are elevated above the interests at stake in a mere monetary dispute.
A fraud suit has the added risk of stigmatizing the defendant as a fraud, and impugning a
defendant's reputation. Hence courts have applied the clear and convincing evidence
standard here to reflect the hybrid nature of a fraud suit. See id. at 424. One exception to
the general rule that clear and convincing evidence should govern fraud suits is the secur-
ities fraud suit. Congress removed securities fraud suits from the rubric of common-law
fraud suits when it enacted the Exchange Act. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 387-
90.
146. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
147. Suits alleging common-law fraud and suits alleging fraud under the federal securi-
ties laws differ in the following ways: (1) whereas a plaintiff must prove reliance to re-
cover under a common-law fraud claim, reliance may be presumed under the federal
securities laws where there is an omission of material fact or there is an allegation of
"fraud on the market." See, eg., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-45 (1988)
(allegation of fraud on the market gives rise to a presumption of reliance); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (material omission give rise to
presumption of reliance); (2) while scienter is an element of both common-law fraud and
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MacLean v. Huddleston,"4 ' the Supreme Court explicitly noted the cur-
rent disparity in burdens of proof that exist between common-law fraud
and actions for fraud predicated on violations of Rule lOb-5.' 4 9 The
Court decided that a preponderance of the evidence standard should gov-
ern the burden of proof in Rule lOb-5 cases. 10 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court rejected the common law fraud standard of proof by
noting historical and practical differences in the natures of the two
remedies. 1 '
The Court reasoned that a major objective of the federal securities stat-
utes was to replace common-law fraud remedies which were ineffective
against securities fraud violations.152 Common-law fraud remedies were
designed to counter frauds involving "tangible items of wealth."' 53 Se-
curities fraud, however, often involves fraud of a different kind-fraud
involving intangible items of wealth such as stocks.'" Furthermore,
Rule lOb-5 fraud, the former requires scienter be proven with a showing of a specific
intent to defraud, however, most courts of appeal agree that recklessness will satisfy the
scienter requirement of the latter. See, eg., Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., 873 F.2d 1094,
1100 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[Majority rule in the Courts of Appeals is that recklessness satis-
fies this scienter requirement."); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (1Ith Cir.
1985) (requiring "severe recklessness"); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); (3) common-law defense of in pari
delicto is not available to certain defendants in actions under the federal securities laws.
See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 319 (1985); (4) com-
mon-law fraud requires proof by clear and convincing evidence while securities fraud
claims under Rule lOb-5 may be shown by the lower burden of proof of a preponderance
of the evidence. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390-91; (5) the Supreme Court
rejected arguments that common-law fraud should provide, by analogy, the statute of
limitations for action under Rule lOb-5. The Court looked to other federal securities acts
instead. See, e-g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct.
2773, 2781 (1991) (rejecting the "assertion that state-law fraud provides the closest anal-
ogy to § 10(b)"); (6) some commentators have argued that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which requires fraud to be pleaded with particularity should not be
applied to claims under the federal securities laws because of the disparities in the natures
of these two frauds; pleading with particularity is often impossible in securities fraud
cases because the evidence of the fraud may be located in the defendant's files. See Wl-
liam M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud- Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. Cal. L
Rev. 959, 977-79 (1987); Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims With Particularity
Under Rule 9(b), 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1432, 1434-39 (1984); Richard D. Greenfield & Robin
Resnick, Rule 9(B): Docket Control Device or Safeguard Against Charges of Fraud?., ALI-
ABA Course of Study (Apr. 23, 1992), available in Westlaw, ALI-ABA File, C751 ALI-
ABA 707.
148. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
149. See id. at 387-91.
150. See id. at 390.
151. See id.
152. See id at 389.
153. Id at 389 n.28.
154. See id One commentator has argued that common law fraud claims differ from
securities fraud claims because of the way each claim arises. A common law fraud claim
generally arises from face-to-face dealings. Such dealings can be detailed and chronicled
by the victim. Securities fraud claims, however, generally arise out of transactions where
there is often no personal contact between the parties. In such a case, the facts of the
particular fraud are likely to be in the possession of the defendant. Securities fraud there-
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Congress designed the federal securities fraud statutes not only to punish
those who commit securities fraud but also to deter others who would
contemplate such fraud. This deterrent objective is furthered by institut-
ing a higher standard of conduct in the securities industry.' A lower
burden of proof facilitates enforcement of the federal securities laws and,
therefore, contributes to maintaining higher standards of conduct within
the securities industry.
Furthermore, the Court compared the plaintiff's interests in securities
litigation with the interests of defendants in such suits. The Court rea-
soned that the interests of defendants in suits brought under Section
10(b) are indistinguishable from the interests of defendants in actions
brought under other federal statutes such as antitrust or civil rights laws
where the preponderance of the evidence governs.156 In contrast, plain-
tiffs' interests in Rule lOb-5 suits are significant because "[d]efrauded in-
vestors are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect.1 157
A heightened burden of proof in securities fraud suits is antithetical to
the purposes of the federal securities statutes. It jeopardizes the goals of
such statutes-creating and fostering a higher standard of conduct in the
securities industry-by increasing the burdens upon those who seek to
enforce such laws. In addition, such a reform may send the wrong signal
to those contemplating fraud. In light of recent scandals in the financial
industry and the publicity surrounding those events, any dilution of the
security fraud statute's deterrent capabilities is ill-advised.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TO REFORM: CIVIL RICO
Present efforts to reform Rule lOb-5 are troublesome. In light of the
essential role private litigants play in the effective functioning of the se-
curities laws and markets,15 8 any reforms that hinder their access to the
courts must be undertaken, if at all, with extreme caution. The premises
underlying proposed Rule 10b-5 reforms, however, are questionable since
they identify issues and implicate effects that are only tangentially related
to Rule lOb-5-an alleged litigation explosion in society, problems with
the class action form of litigation, and accountant liability.
Although Congress should abandon its current efforts at Rule lOb-5
reform, it should nevertheless seize this opportunity to address the abuses
that continue to grow in another area of securities fraud litigation. The
particular reform suggested by some commentators '59 and considered by
fore is often more difficult for a plaintiff to prove. See Note, Pleading Securities Fraud
Claims With Particularity Under Rule 9(b), 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1432, 1435-39 (1984).
155. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983).
156. See id at 390.
157. Id.
158. See discussion supra part I.
159. See Richard C. Breeden, Remarks at Corporate Counsel Institute 9-10 (Oct. 16,
1991) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review); 138 Cong. Rec. S12,603 (daily
ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (comments of Richard C. Breeden on proposed Rule lOb-5 reforms,
arguing that he would "support the repeal of securities fraud as a predicate offense for
S374 [Vol. 61
EFFORTS AT RULE 10b-5 REFORM
Congress in the past, is civil RICO reform. 'I
Civil RICO is an alluring reform alternative because it is included in
many Rule lOb-5 actions. Reform of civil RICO is capable of addressing
the concerns of those who currently support Rule lOb-5 reform while
also catering to the concerns of those who oppose it. Like Rule lOb-5,
RICO provides a remedy for securities fraud violations. And, as will be
seen below, RICO litigation contains many of the vices currently attrib-
uted to Rule lOb-5 lawsuits---especially the potential for extortionate liti-
gation and frivolous suits. In addition, Civil RICO reform can be
undertaken without the danger of a significant impingement on the effec-
tiveness of the private attorney general patrol.
A. Brief History of RICO and Its Application to Securities Fraud
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO 6' to shield legitimate business from
the "infiltration of organized crime." '162 Despite this limited intent,
plaintiffs now use RICO to sue legitimate businesses more often than
they use it to target organized crime.'63 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
decried RICO's transformation into something different from that which
Congress originally intended.' RICO's broad application is, in part, a
result of its capacious language: 6 RICO contains a liberal construction
civil actions under [RICO]. Civil RICO is an unnecessary duplication of existing securi-
ties law remedies."); Roberts Urges Industry Course Change On Litigation Reform, 24
Wall St. Letter (Institutional Investor, Inc.) at 6, Sept. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File.
160. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearings on S 1433 Before the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hearing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 14 (1991) (statements of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of
the SEC arguing for elimination of securities fraud predicate under RICO); HL.R 5445,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 2983, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 3240, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
161. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
162. Douglas E. Abrams, The Law of Civil RICO 4 (1991) ("According to the Senate
Report, RICO's primary purpose was to 'eliminat[e] . . . the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.'"
(citations omitted)); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (Con-
gress enacted RICO "as a measure to deal with the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime").
163. See Abrams, supra note 159, at 8; William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief
Justice, 21 St. Mary's L.J. 5, 9 (1989) ("Virtually everyone who has addressed the ques-
tion agrees that civil RICO is now being used in ways that Congress never intended.").
But see G. Robert Blakey, Forward, Symposium, Law and the Continuing Enterprise:
Perspectives on RICO, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 873, 880 (1990) (citing statements of
Supreme Court that RICO's language and legislative history militate against restrictive
application of RICO to organized crime).
164. See Abrams, supra note 162, at 5 (citing to opinion in Sedima S.P.R.L v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (" 'RICO is evolving into something quite different from
the original conception of its enactors.' "). But see Blakey, supra note 163, at 875 &
nn.49-54 (1990) (RICO's legislative history contains numerous statements of the bill's
sponsors indicating that RICO applies to actions against defendants not involved in or-
ganized crime).
165. See Abrams, supra note 159, at 15-16 & nn. 4-5.
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clause which constrains courts from interpreting RICO restrictively. 166
RICO provides a remedy for securities fraud violations. 67 Commen-
tators have raised concerns that RICO's securities fraud provision threat-
ens to supplant traditional federal securities fraud remedies such as Rule
10b-5. 68 Indeed, it has become commonplace for a plaintiff who asserts
an implied remedy under the securities laws to append a RICO claim to
the complaint. 169 In fact, some have warned that an attorney's failure to
allege a violation of RICO when filing a securities fraud action consti-
tutes legal malpractice.170
Plaintiffs' use of RICO as a concomitant to federal securities fraud
provisions is problematic for a number of reasons. First, Congress did
not intend RICO's provision permitting its application to securities fraud
to be coextensive with section 10(b) of the '34 Act. 71 Nor did Congress
intend that RICO supplant the traditional remedies for common securi-
ties fraud provided under the '33 and '34 Acts. 72  Second, while the
courts have been restricting the traditional securities fraud remedies of
the '33 and '34 Acts, they generally have not done so with RICO. 73
A plaintiff who pursues a RICO claim in addition to or instead of a
Rule lOb-5 claim enjoys manifold benefits. RICO provides for
mandatory trebling of damages. 74 In addition, reasonable attorneys'
166. In contrast, the courts have not had difficulty restricting the contours of Rule
lOb-5. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975)
(imposing a buyer/seller standing limitation for suits predicated on violation of Rule lOb-
5).
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). This section provides in relevant part that "rack-
eteering activity, means... any offense involving... fraud in the sale of secuities...
punishable under any law of the United States." Id.
168. See IA Harold S. Bloomenthal, Going Public and the Public Corporation § 10, at
64 (1992); Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets:
The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 896, 896-98
(1990).
169. See IA Harold S. Bloomenthal, Going Public and the Public Corporation § 10.08,
at 64 (1992).
170. See Abrams, supra note 162, at 6.
171. See Michael N. Glanz, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1513, 1534-39 (1983).
172. See L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1050, 1055 (1990) ("[T]here is no evidence that Congress intended to
replace the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934 with RICO .... ").
173. See Mathews, supra note 168, at 896-98. Because the Courts implied a private
remedy for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the '34 Act, they have more freedom to
define its boundaries than if Congress had explicitly legislated the right as in RICO. See
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1326-27 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (O'Connor arguing that because the Court implied the right
of action under § 10(b) it was free to adopt a purchaser/seller limitation in § 10(b) cases
"as a prudential means of avoiding the problems of proof when no security was traded
and the nuisance potential of vexatious litigation"). But see Reves v. Ernst & Young, No.
91-886, 1993 WL 52169 (U.S. March 3, 1993) (limiting application of RICO to persons
who either operated or managed a RICO enterprise).
174. See Abrams, supra note 162, at 152.
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fees must be awarded to a successful plaintiff.1 75  Finally, a recent
Supreme Court opinion suggests that RICO permits a broader class of
plaintiffs to sue under its provisions than does Rule lOb-5.176 In Holmes
v. Securities Investors Protection Corp.,'7 7 the Supreme Court faced the
issue of whether a RICO claim predicated on violation of Rule lOb-5
incorporates that Rule's buyer/seller standing limitation. 178 The Court
avoided the issue by finding an alternative route to dispose of the
claim.179 Two concurring opinions in which a total of four Justices
joined, argued, however, that standing to bring a RICO claim predicated
on securities fraud violations is not limited to buyers and sellers of securi-
ties.18 This decision portends that persons who are neither buyers nor
sellers, and precluded from suing under Rule lOb-5, can turn to RICO
for a remedy. Such a possibility subverts the Court's carefully crafted
standing limitations of Rule lOb-5 and opens the door to increased
litigation.18
175. See id. at 168.
176. See Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322 (concurring opinions suggesting that buyer/seller
limitation does not apply to RICO claim predicated on Rule 1Ob-5 offense). For cases
explicitly rejecting a buyer/seller limitation for RICO claims predicated on Rule lOb-5
violations, see Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1465-67
(9th Cir. 1990) (purchaser/seller limitation does not apply to RICO claim for fraud in the
sale of securities); Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (rejecting buyer/seller limitation for RICO claims predicated on acts of securities
fraud). For cases adopting a buyer/seller limitation for RICO claims predicated on acts
of fraud in the sale of securities, see International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d
149, 151-54 (4th Cir. 1987) (buyer/seller limitation applies to RICO claims predicated on
acts of fraud in the sale of securities); Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1046 (8th
Cir. 1986) (buyer/seller limitation applies to RICO claims predicated on acts of fraud in
the sale of securities).
177. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
178. See id. at 1316 n.7. The SIPC is a private non-profit corporation formed under
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988). It is
designed to protect the customers of failed broker-dealers. See id. §§ 78eee(a)(3)-(b)(3).
Generally, after certain statutory conditions are satisfied, the SIPC can ask a court to
appoint a trustee to liquidate a failed broker-dealer's business. See id. The SIPC insures
the customers of a failed broker dealer by advancing up to $500,000 per customer to the
trustee in the event that funds collected by the trustee through the liquidation are insuffi-
cient to satisfy the customers' claims. See id. § 78fff-3(a).
In Holmes, the SIPC advanced $13 million to cover the claims of customers of two
defunct broker-dealers. See Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1315. As subrogee to the customers'
claim, the SIPC instituted a suit against 75 defendants alleging that those defendants
manipulated stock in violation of § 10(b) of the '34 Act, and that those manipulations
caused the demise of the broker-dealers and the customers' damages. See id. Further-
more, the SIPC alleged that these violations constituted a pattern of racketeering actiona-
ble under RICO. See id.
179. The Court found that there was no need to address the buyer/seller question
because the plaintiff's claim failed to establish proximate cause. See Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at
1311, 1321-22.
180. See id. at 1322 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices White and Steven joined her
concurrence. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 1327.
181. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor acknowledged this danger when she
stated that "problems of expansive standing identified in Blue Chip Stamps are exacer-
bated in RICO." Id. at 1327.
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B. Elimination of RICO's Application to Securities Fraud in Lieu of
Rule 10b-5 Reform
RICO reform is capable of alleviating some abuses cited by supporters
of Rule 10b-5 reform. Because RICO provides for mandatory trebling of
damages and awarding of attorney fees to the successful plaintiff, RICO
embodies a danger of extortionate litigation. 3 2 In addition, although the
recent Supreme Court decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young183 attenuates
the dangers RICO poses to accountants by holding RICO applicable
only against persons who operated or managed an enterprise, plaintiffs
will nonetheless continue to use RICO against legitimate businesses. 184
Thus, RICO reform would address problems of extortionate litigation.
182. See Jay Kelly Wright, Why Are Professionals Worried About RICO?, 65 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 983 (1990). The author describes RICO's threat to professionals as
follows:
Treble damages become a weapon to induce settlement .... "[To induce an
earlier and more favorable settlement, the [liquidator] will wish to charge the
auditor not merely with negligence or breach of contract, but with common law
and statutory fraud (such as RICO) because the latter counts create the pros-
pect of recovering punitive or treble damages as well as costs and counsel fees."
Id. at 993. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
183. No. 91-886, 1993 WL 52169 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1993).
184. Accounting groups have long targeted RICO for legislative reform. See Wright,
supra note 182, at 984. "Professionals are worried about RICO. The American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, for example, has been in the forefront of some of the
legislative efforts to amend RICO to limit the statute's reach." Id. Professionals are
susceptible to RICO claims because
civil RICO has exacerbated those tendencies of the law to target professionals
as deep pockets. Not only has RICO spurred the search for deep pockets by the
lure of treble damages, the rhetoric of RICO has significantly distorted the for-
mulation of legal principles and has skewed analysis in favor of greater liability.
Id. at 984-85; see also IA Harold S. Bloomenthal, Going Public and the Public Corpora-
tion § 10.08, at 64 (1992) (noting plaintiff use of RICO as a securities fraud remedy will
likely exacerbate the trend that is currently moving towards greater professional liability
without regard to the significance of the professional's role in the fraud).
Although the accounting industry's efforts have not resulted in legislative curtailment
of RICO, the Supreme Court recently responded to the accounting industry's call for
relief. In Reves v. Ernst & Young, No. 91-886, 1993 WL 52169 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1993), the
Supreme Court held, in a seminal decision, that "one must participate in the operation or
management of [an] enterprise" in order to be liable under RICO. Id. at *9. Reves is a
landmark decision because it represents one of the first times the Supreme Court has
limited RICO's application by side-stepping RICO's "liberal construction" clause which
directs the Court to interpret RICO's provisions liberally. See, e.g., Sedima S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) ("[A] less restrictive reading [of RICO] is amply
supported by our prior cases and the general principles surrounding this statute. RICO is
to be read broadly."); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (Congress did
not act beyond the scope of its power when it enacted RICO. "[T]he courts are [there-
fore] without authority to restrict the application of the statute.").
The plaintiff in Reves was a trustee in Bankruptcy who brought suit on behalf of the
debtor and some of the debtor's creditors, against Arthur Young, the debtor's auditor.
See Reves, 1993 WL 52169, at *4. The Trustee alleged that as the debtor's auditor, Ar-
thur Young had violated RICO by committing mail and securities fraud. See Arthur
Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1991). The Circuit court found
that although "Arthur Young committed a number of reprehensible acts," including acts
in violation of Rule lOb-5, Arthur Young's involvement with the debtor did not "rise to
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Regardless of whether one agrees with the notion of a litigation explo-
sion, reforming RICO by eliminating its applicability to securities fraud
the level of participation in the management or operation of the [debtor]" sufficient to
meet the requirements of a RICO claim. Id. at 1324.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between circuit courts con-
cerning interpretation of one of RICO's provisions. See Reres, 1993 WL 52169, at *4.
The provision in question makes it unlawful "'for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.'" Id. at *2 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1988)). The Eighth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit both inter-
preted this provision as limiting RICO's application to those who participated in the
operation and management of an enterprise. See Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364
(en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local
Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 954 (1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2839 (1991). The
Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected such a limitation. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Reves Court adopted the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of § 1962(c). In arriving
at its conclusion, the Court first interpreted the word "conduct" in § 1962(c) of RICO.
That section makes it unlawful "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs." Id. at *5. The Court determined that the word
"conduct," in context, contemplates some "degree of direction." Id. The Court then
interpreted the word "participate" to mean "to take part in." Id. (citing Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1646 (1976)). Applying these two interpretations to
§ 1962(c), the Court conluded that "[i]n order to 'participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' one must have some part in directing those affairs."
Id. at *6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). The Court buttressed its conclusions by looking
to RICO's legislative history to find that "Congress did not intend RICO to extend be-
yond the acquisition or operation of an enterprise." Id. at *7.
Significantly, the Court adopted the more restrictive "operation or management" re-
quirement despite Congress' directive that courts construe liberally RICO's provisions.
See id. at *8. According to the Court, RICO's liberal construction clause should only be
used to resolve an ambiguity. See id. Because the Court found RICO's legislative history
to support clearly the "operation or management" standard, no ambiguity existed and it
found RICO's liberal construction clause to be inapplicable.
The dissent disagreed. Justices Souter and White argued in dissent that RICO's liberal
construction clause is "dispositive" and RICO's provisions could not therefore be limited
to those involved in operation or management of the enterprise. See id. at * 10 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters pointed to more liberal alternative definitions of the word
"conduct," to challenge the majority's assertion that "conduct" be interpreted to import
some degree of direction. See id. at *10-11. For example, as a noun "conduct" means
"'carrying forward' or 'carrying out' "-definitions that do not imply direction or con-
trol. Id. at *10 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 473 (1976)). The
dissent argued that in light of at least two plausible alternative definitions to the word
"conduct" some level of ambiguity existed. Therefore the Court should invoke RICO's
liberal construction clause to resolve the ambiguity and adopt the more inclusive defini-
tion--one that does not limit "conduct" to connote direction or control. See id. at * 11.
Because Reves limits RICO's reach to those who operated or managed an enterprise,
many accountants, lawyers, investment bankers, and others who have been subjected to
RICO suits in the past will no longer be targets for such suits. The Reves limitation will
no doubt curtail, to some extent, plaintiff abuse of RICO's provisions. Nonetheless,
many of the abuses caused by RICO's overlap of Rule lob-5 persist. Plaintiffs will con-
tinue to supplement their Rule lOb-5 claims with allegations of RICO violations in cases
where the defendant did operate or manage an enterprise. Furthermore, RICO claims
against accountants may continue despite Reyes because the degree of management neces-
sary to support a RICO claim will likely be litigated and applied to different facts.
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will curtail some excessive litigation created by the overlap of securities
fraud remedies.1"' RICO reform does not embody the dangers inherent
in Rule lOb-5 reform-a restriction of its provisions will not hinder the
private enforcement of the securities laws. As noted above, Congress'
original intent in imbuing RICO with a securities fraud remedy was to
allow for its application to organized crime.1 8 6 Congress did not intend
for RICO to replace the federal securities fraud remedies under the '33
and '34 Acts. 8 7 RICO's current use extends beyond that limited pur-
pose and encroaches on areas of securities fraud traditionally remedied
by federal securities fraud statutes. Thus, reform that eliminates RICO's
application to securities fraud will not jeopardize the private enforcement
of the federal securities laws because traditional securities fraud remedies
remain.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of Rule lOb-5 reform has wide ramifications for the se-
curities markets, investors, and the financial services industry. It may
hinder the private enforcement of the securities laws and threaten the
integrity of the financial markets. These concerns are particularly acute
because faulty premises underlie efforts towards reform. The premises of
Rule lOb-5 reform are faulty because they attribute to the Rule the ad-
verse effects of other problematic areas including problems associated
with accountant independence, societal perceptions of a litigation explo-
sion, and class action litigation. While Congress should take steps to
recognize and solve these issues, it should first direct its attention to
RICO reform because RICO reform avoids the dangers inherent in re-
striction of Rule lOb-5. Congress can, thereby, achieve the appropriate
balance between deterrence of securities fraud, remedies for securities
fraud, and limitations on excessive litigation.
185. See Richard C. Breeden, Remarks at the Meeting of the Corporate Counsel Insti-
tute 9 (Oct. 16, 1991) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
186. See Michael N. Glanz, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1513, 1522-26 (1983).
187. See id.
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